· .	·	30 Octob	er 1954	•
5X1		Copy No	· 80	25X1
				23/(1
	CURRENT INTELL	GENCE BULLETIN		
	DOCUMENT NO. 4 NO CHANGE IN CLASS.	M. Samurana		
	EL DECLASSIFIED CLASS, CHANGED TO: NEXT REVIEW DATE:	rs s c	•	
·	NEXT REVIEW DATE:			25X
	DATE: July 0.0			
				25X1
	Office of Cur	rent Intelligence		
	CENTED AT INTER	LICENCE ACENCY		0EV4
	CENTRAL INTE	LLIGENCE AGENCY		25X1
		·		

	Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A901800040001-7	
	25X1A SUMMARY	
	GENERAL	
1.	Relations between Argentina and Spain severely strained (page 3).	
	FAR EAST	
2.	Comment on North Korean foreign minister's renewed call for unification talks (page 3).	
	SOUTHEAST ASIA	
A	Bao Dai reportedly sets price for his support of Diem (page 5).	
<u>4.</u> .	Bao Dai reportedly sets price for mo support of Susan Conference of the support of Susan Conference of Susan Conference of the support of Susan Conference of Sus	25X1
	NEAR EAST - AFRICA	
8.	Comment on political effects of attempted assassination or Egyptian premier (page 8).	25X1

EASTERN EUROPE

Tito outlines Yugoslav policy to Stassen (page 9).

25X1

25X1

25X1

10. East German Communist Party morale shaken by fraudulent elections (page 9).

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 30 Oct 54

GENERAL

25X1

1.	Relations between Argentina and Spain severely strained:
	The Buenos Aires press is
	bitterly denouncing Spain's continuing failure to agree to a plan for repaying its large debt to Argentina. This debt, arising from
	and the granted Spain during 1947-49 has been variously estimated
	between \$66,000,000 and \$182,000,000, depending on the hotly debated exchange rate. Argentina, now in financial straits itself,
	is capacially piqued at Madrid's attitude, because spain is receive
	ing substantial financial aid under the 1953 economic and military agreements with the United States.
	agreements with the onlock states.
	FAR EAST
2	. Comment on North Korean foreign minister's renewed call for
	unification talks:
25X1	Foreign Minister Nam Il's call of 28 October for talks regarding Korean unifica-
	tion takes on special significance in the
	30 Oct 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3


25X1

Approved For Releas = 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001800040001-7

The Chinese and North Korean Communists presumably are trying, by this maneuver, to pose as the champions of Korean unification in particular and the peaceful solution of all international disputes in general and to put the United States and Britain in the position in the eyes of Asians of seeming to oppose these purposes. Nam's call for a meeting of representatives from the north and south to "expedite unification" offers no new concessions. It is, however, a further step in North Korea's accelerated campaign for economic and cultural interchanges. Radio Pyongyang has dangled attractive trade offers before the south since July and recently has made propaganda capital out of the current American-South Korean impasse on aid. By combining demands for new talks with trade proposals, Pyongyang apparently hopes to entice South Korea into economic, and finally political, co-operation on Communist terms President Rhee has steadfastly opposed more international talks on unification, and has brushed off Pyong yang's trade offers. There is strong sentiment among many Kore-	The Chinese and North Korean Communists presumably are trying, by this maneuver, to pose as the champions of Korean unification in particular and the peaceful solution of all international disputes in general and to put the United States and Britain in the position in the eyes of Asians of seeming to oppose these purposes. Nam's call for a meeting of representatives from the north and south to "expedite unification" offers no new concessions. It is, however, a further step in North Korea's accelerated campaign for economic and cultural interchanges. Radio Pyongyang has dangled attractive trade offers before the south since July and recently has made propaganda capital out of the current American-South Korean impasse on aid. By combining demands for new talks with trade proposals, Pyongyang apparently hopes to entice South Korea into economic, and finally political, co-operation on Communist terms President Rhee has steadfastly opposed more international talks on unification, and has brushed off Pyongyang's trade offers. There is strong sentiment among many Koreans, however, for trade with the north as an alternative to growing	lia	25X1A ght of the Chou-Nehru agreement to make renewed attempts to
nists presumably are trying, by this maneuver, to pose as the champions of Korean unification in particular and the peaceful solution of all international disputes in general and to put the United States and Britain in the position in the eyes of Asians of seeming to oppose these purposes. Nam's call for a meeting of representatives from the north and south to "expedite unification" offers no new concessions. It is, however, a further step in North Korea's accelerated campaign for economic and cultural interchanges. Radio Pyongyang has dangled attractive trade offers before the south since July and recently has made propaganda capital out of the current American-South Korean impasse on aid. By combining demands for new talks with trade proposals, Pyongyang apparently hopes to entice South Korea into economic, and finally political, co-operation on Communist terms President Rhee has steadfastly opposed more international talks on unification, and has brushed off Pyong yang's trade offers. There is strong sentiment among many Koreans, however, for trade with the north as an alternative to growin	nists presumably are trying, by this maneuver, to pose as the champions of Korean unification in particular and the peaceful solution of all international disputes in general and to put the United States and Britain in the position in the eyes of Asians of seeming to oppose these purposes. Nam's call for a meeting of representatives from the north and south to "expedite unification" offers no new concessions. It is, however, a further step in North Korea's accelerated campaign for economic and cultural interchanges. Radio Pyongyang has dangled attractive trade offers before the south since July and recently has made propaganda capital out of the current American-South Korean impasse on aid. By combining demands for new talks with trade proposals, Pyongyang apparently hopes to entice South Korea into economic, and finally political, co-operation on Communist terms President Rhee has steadfastly opposed more international talks on unification, and has brushed off Pyongyang's trade offers. There is strong sentiment among many Koreans, however, for trade with the north as an alternative to growing	se	ttle the Korean problem, possibly at a conference of "neutral
Radio Pyongyang has dangled attractive trade offers before the south since July and recently has made propaganda capital out of the current American-South Korea impasse on aid. By combining demands for new talks with trade proposals, Pyongyang apparently hopes to entice South Korea into economic, and finally political, co-operation on Communist terms President Rhee has steadfastly opposed more international talks on unification, and has brushed off Pyong yang's trade offers. There is strong sentiment among many Koreans, however, for trade with the north as an alternative to growin	Radio Pyongyang has dangled attractive trade offers before the south since July and recently has made propaganda capital out of the current American-South Korea impasse on aid. By combining demands for new talks with trade proposals, Pyongyang apparently hopes to entice South Korea into economic, and finally political, co-operation on Communist terms President Rhee has steadfastly opposed more international talks on unification, and has brushed off Pyongyang's trade offers. There is strong sentiment among many Koreans, however, for trade with the north as an alternative to growing	ch lut Sta	sts presumably are trying, by this maneuver, to pose as the ampions of Korean unification in particular and the peaceful sotion of all international disputes in general and to put the United ates and Britain in the position in the eyes of Asians of seeming
trade offers before the south since July and recently has made propaganda capital out of the current American-South Korean impasse on aid. By combining demands for new talks with trade proposals, Pyongyang apparently hopes to entice South Korea into economic, and finally political, co-operation on Communist terms President Rhee has steadfastly opposed more international talks on unification, and has brushed off Pyong yang's trade offers. There is strong sentiment among many Koreans, however, for trade with the north as an alternative to growin	trade offers before the south since July and recently has made propaganda capital out of the current American-South Korean impasse on aid. By combining demands for new talks with trade proposals, Pyongyang apparently hopes to entice South Korea into economic, and finally political, co-operation on Communist terms President Rhee has steadfastly opposed more international talks on unification, and has brushed off Pyongyang's trade offers. There is strong sentiment among many Koreans, however, for trade with the north as an alternative to growing	ne	ves from the north and south to "expedite unification" offers no ew concessions. It is, however, a further step in North Korea's
more international talks on unification, and has brushed off Pyong yang's trade offers. There is strong sentiment among many Koreans, however, for trade with the north as an alternative to growin	more international talks on unification, and has brushed off Pyong- yang's trade offers. There is strong sentiment among many Kore- ans, however, for trade with the north as an alternative to growing	pr pa	ade offers before the south since July and recently has made ropaganda capital out of the current American-South Korean imasse on aid. By combining demands for new talks with trade roposals. Propagang apparently hopes to entice South Korea into
		ya ar	ore international talks on unification, and has brushed off Pyong ang's trade offers. There is strong sentiment among many Kore- as, however, for trade with the north as an alternative to growin

Approved For Releas 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001800040001-7

25X1A



Approved For Releas 25200812/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001800040001-7

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

•		
•	Approved For Belease	2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T0097 5A 001800040001-7
a.		
5X1		
8.	Comment on political tian premier:	effects of attempted assassination of Egyp-
		Egyptian prime minister Nasr has
•		achieved genuine popularity and admiration for the first time as a result of his
5X1A		behavior during the attempt on his life in Alexandria on 26 October. Nasr's adroit
		handling of the situation won the immediate respect of the crowd, which had
		been unruly and even somewhat hostile to him before the shooting.
		Nasr's newly gained popular support,
		evident in subsequent demonstrations,
		_ considerably strengthens the regime in the the extremist Moslem Brotherhood. The
		and Council has now thrown down the gaunt- daccused of responsibility for the attack
		s dissolution on 29 October, and widespread in progress. The regime has thus gained a
		ccess, but its long-range prospects are still
	25X1A	
	····	

25X1A

Approved For Releas 2603/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T00975A001800040001-7

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 8

30 Oct 54

25X1A -

EASTERN EUROPE

9. Tito outlines Yugoslav policy to Stassen:

25X1A

Yugoslav president Tito told Foreign Operations Administrator Stassen on 26 October that Yugoslavia will not cut its defense expenditures although he sees

no present danger of Soviet aggression. He thinks the present Soviet leaders dropped Stalin's policies not from choice but because the policies had failed both internally and in the field of foreign affairs. The danger of Soviet aggression could return, he said, if the free world let down its guard.

Tito said that talk of Yugoslavia's going back to the Cominform was "arrant nonsense," and that he had made it clear to Soviet representatives that they must not expect the normalization of relations to alter the growing Yugoslav cooperation with the West. The USSR had accepted this and begun the normalization process on this basis.

Tito called the Balkan alliance one of the cornerstones of Yugoslav policy. He said that collaboration between the alliance and the expanded Brussels pact must in some way encompass the fields of culture, economy, and politics as well as defense.

Comment: Since Tito's visit to Turkey in April, the Yugoslavs have expressed cautious willingness for some sort of co-operation with Western European defense schemes. They have done nothing yet to define the methods or extent to which they are willing to commit themselves, however.

10. East German Communist Party morale shaken by fraudulent elections:

25X1A

According to American assistant high commissioner Parkman in Berlin, the morale of rank and file members of the East German Socialist Unity (Commu-

nist) Party (SED), already generally low, has been further shaken

30 Oct 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 9

Approved For Release 2003/12/03 : CIA-RDP79T009754401800040001-7 25X1A

by the blatant fraudulence of the voting procedure in the 17 October elections. Parkman believes that the SED leadership is already conducting a special screening of cadres to squeeze out political unreliables.

He anticipates that these two factors will at least increase dissension within the party.

Comment: The SED has long been faced with the choice of purging unreliables—the former Social Democrats, the politically indifferent, and the nationalist Communists who oppose specific party policies—or of trying to indoctrinate and integrate them. Since the party leaders must have known that openly fraudulent elections would only increase these elements' disenchantment with the political situation, it seems likely that they had already given up hope of converting such discontents and resolved instead to purge them.

 $\alpha \in V \cap$

25X1A

23/10			
•			

30 Oct 54 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10